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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Ashli Marie Easterday appeals from the district court's denial of her motion to 
suppress evidence found in a search of her purse. In the district court, she asserted 
that, following a traffic stop and a canine alert on her vehicle, the officer illegally 
searched her purse. The district court denied the motion because it found that 
Ms. Easterday's purse was not on her person at the time probable cause to search the 
car was established, and therefore, the purse was subject to search under the 
automobile exception. Subsequently, Ms. Easterday entered a conditional plea of 
guilty, preserving her right to appeal the denial of her motion to suppress. 
In her Appellant's Brief, Ms. Easterday argued that the search of her purse was a 
search of her person, which is not allowed under the automobile exception. She 
asserted that the search of the purse was a search of her person because her purse 
was in normal use when she was stopped by the officer; it was right next to her on the 
car seat. And, when she was told to leave the car after the canine alert, she brought it 
with her. She also argued that the district court's ruling would create an unworkable 
and discriminatory standard because it would require that, in order to be considered a 
part of her person, a woman's purse must be in her lap when driving, and for the 
duration of a traffic stop. 
The State argues that the search of Ms. Easterday's purse should be viewed like 
the search of any other container. In other words, the fact that this search concerned a 
purse should be of no consequence in the analysis. Indeed, the State likens her purse 
to a backpack in the back seat of a car. It also argues that some of the precedent on 
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which Ms. Easterday relies in her Appellant's Brief is inapplicable to this case because it 
is based on the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement instead of 
the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. Finally, the State asserts that 
there is no inherent discrimination in treating men's wallets differently than women's 
purses. 
The State's arguments fail. First, the Idaho Court of Appeals has acknowledged 
that purses and wallets are unique and often considered part of the person and 
therefore not subject to search like other containers in a car. And, while the State's 
second argument neatly summarizes the difference between the automobile exception 
and the incident to arrest exception, the State provides no reason as to why this 
difference is relevant to an analysis of the circumstances under which a purse is 
considered part of the person. It also ignores the fact that the district court, in its 
memorandum opinion, specifically relied on some of the precedent the State calls 
"inapplicable" to this case. More importantly, it misstates the facts of the only case that 
it admits is applicable to this situation. Finally, the State's argument regarding 
discrimination misses the point as to why women need to carry purses in the first place. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Ms. Easterday's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but 
are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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Because Deputy Gorrell impermissibly expanded the search of the car to a search of 
Ms. Easterday's person, did the district court err when it denied Ms. Easterday's motion 
to suppress? 
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Because Deputy Gorrell lmpermissibly Expanded The Search Of The Car To A Search 
Of Ms. Easterday's Person, The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Easterday's 
Motion To Suppress 
Introduction 
The district court should have granted Ms. motion suppress 
because law enforcement illegally searched her purse, which should have been 
considered part of her person when she exited the car with it. Therefore, the purse was 
not subject to search without a warrant. The State's arguments to the contrary fail 
because the State does not acknowledge that purses are considered part of the person 
when in normal use, and thus, they are not like containers. Further, the State 
misunderstands Ms. Easterday's arguments in regards to the discrimination inherent in 
treating purses differently than wallets, the problems with the district court's ruling. 
B. The State's Arguments Fail Because The State Relies On Precedent That Does 
Not Concern Purses, Misstates The Facts Of One Case, And Ignores The Fact 
That The District Court Actually Relied On One Of The Cases The State Calls 
Inapplicable To This Case 
1. Purses And Wallets Are Different Than Other Containers Because They 
Are Often Considered Part Of The Person And Therefore Not Subject To 
Search Under The Automobile Exception To The Warrant Requirement 
The Idaho Court of Appeals stated, "We agree that a purse and perhaps a billfold 
are items that can be considered part of the person, much like the clothing a person is 
wearing." State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 183 (Ct. App. 2004). Similarly, in a concurring 
opinion, Justice Breyer, of the United States Supreme Court wrote: 
Purses are special containers. They are repositories of especially personal 
items that people generally like to keep with them at all times. So I am 
tempted to say that a search of a purse involves an intrusion so similar to 
a search of one's person that the same rule should govern both. However, 
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given this Court's prior cases, I cannot argue that the fact that the 
container was a purse automatically makes a legal difference, for the 
Court has warned against trying to make that kind of distinction. But I can 
say that it would matter if a woman's purse, like a man's billfold, were 
attached to her person. It might then amount to a kind of "outer clothing," 
which under the Court's cases would properly receive increased protection 
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 308 (1999) (emphasis in original) (citations 
omitted). 
The warning Justice Breyer was referring to is the language from United States v. 
Ross, 56 U.S. 798 (1982). There, the Court said that "[t]he scope of a warrantless 
search of an automobile is not defined by the nature of the container in which the 
contraband is secreted. Rather, it is defined by the object of the search and the places 
in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found." Id. at 824. However, 
as the Idaho Court of Appeals, and obviously Justice Breyer, have recognized, this 
standard does not always apply to purses and wallets because they are often 
considered part of the person because of the way they are used and the highly personal 
nature of their contents. 
The State's analysis in this case ignores the unique nature of purses. In 
particular, it does not acknowledge how they are used by female drivers. Therefore, it 
relies on precedent that is not relevant to an analysis of a purse search and is easily 
distinguishable. Indeed, the State asserts that this case is similar to State v. Smith, 152 
Idaho 115 (Ct. App. 2011). (Resp. Br., pp.6-8, 10-11.) In Smith, the defendant 
originally left his car and walked over to speak with an officer. Id. at 117. When the two 
men returned to the car so that Mr. Smith could show the officer his identification, the 
officer saw a marijuana pipe on the front seat of the car. Id. This established probable 
cause to search the car, but Mr. Smith had a dog in the car that posed a threat to the 
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officer. Id. at 121, 117. When the officer asked Mr. Smith to take the dog out, Mr. Smith 
took his backpack from the backseat and used the straps on the backpack to restrain 
the dog. Id. at 117. Later, the officer searched the man's backpack and found 
marijuana. Id. at 118-19. The State argues that Ms. Easterday's situation is similar to 
that of the driver in Smith, and, therefore, "[t]he same analysis that vvas applied to 
Smith's backpack should be applied to Easterday's purse." (Resp. Br. p.8.) However, 
the facts of Smith more closely resemble those of State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 159 
(2000), where the defendant voluntarily left her purse behind in the car and then asked 
to take it later. Id. at 163.1 Additionally, not only are the facts in Smith easily 
distinguishable from this case, but the State fails to recognize that a backpack is not 
regarded as a repository of personal items that can be considered part of the person. A 
backpack is just a piece of luggage. 
Here, Ms. Easterday never left her purse in the car; she took it with her 
immediately upon being told get out of the car. (Tr. 8/2/13, p.15, Ls.4-19, p.18, L.20-
p.19, L.1.) But more importantly, even if Mr. Smith had taken his backpack with him 
when he left the car, it likely would have been subject to search because it was not a 
purse or a wallet, but rather a regular piece of luggage. Therefore, it could not have 
been considered part of his person. 
The State's confusion stems from its focus on only one part of Ms. Easterday's 
argument - that when she took her purse with her, it was not subject to search. (Resp. 
Br. p.5.) While taking it with her was obviously important, it would not have been 
important if she had taken a backpack with her, or, if she had originally left her purse in 
1 See Appellant's Brief pp.8-9. 
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the car when told to exit. But she did not do that. Here, her purse was sitting right next 
to her, where a purse would ordinarily be, while she likely retrieved her identification for 
the officers. (Tr. 8/2/13, p.15, Ls.4-19.) And Ms. Easterday took the purse with her, as 
a woman ordinarily would when leaving her car, so it was a part of her person, unlike 
the backpack in Smith, which could never be considered part of Mr. Smith's clothing. 
2. Idaho's Precedent Regarding Purses That Were Searched Under The 
Search Incident To Arrest Doctrine Is Not Inapplicable, And Its Precedent 
Regarding A Wallet That Was Searched Under the Automobile Exception 
Is Directly On Point 
The State also argues that, except for one case, "[t]he cases relied on by 
Easterday are distinguishable" and "inapplicable because they analyze the scope of the 
search incident to arrest doctrine, and do not examine the scope of the automobile 
exception." (Resp. Br., p.8.) It cites to no authority for this statement except to say that 
"[t]he district court found the search incident to arrest doctrine is not applicable to this 
case." (Resp. Br., p.10.) As argued in the Appellant's Brief, the district court went to 
great lengths to point out that this case does not involve the search incident to arrest 
exception, and stated that the Holland case was not instructive because it concerned a 
search incident to arrest. (App. Br. p.12.) But the State fails to acknowledge that even 
though the district court tried to make this distinction, it specifically relied on State v. 
Newsom, 132 Idaho 698, 700 (1998), which was also decided based on the search 
incident to arrest exception. It said, "Unlike the facts in Newsom, the facts in the instant 
case make clear that at no point during the deployment of the drug dog did Easterday 
remove the purse from its position beside her and place it on her lap such that it 
became a part of her person .... " (R. p.104.) Thus it is clear that the action that the 
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purse's owner takes is the important consideration, not the exception to the warrant 
requirement under which the case is analyzed. And ultimately, whether these cases are 
inapplicable is not the critical issue, because there is a case that was decided under the 
automobile exception that should have controlled this situation. That case was State v. 
Gibson, 141 Idaho 277 (Ct. App. 2005). 
While the State admits that Gibson is applicable, it misstates the facts of that 
case. It states that "Gibson's wallet was in his jacket at the time the drug dog 
established probable cause to search. In contrast, Easterday's purse was not on her 
person at the time probable cause to search was established .... " (Resp. Br., p.8.) 
But the Gibson Court never made the finding that Mr. Gibson's wallet was in his jacket 
at the time probable cause was established. In fact, there was no finding that 
Mr. Gibson even had his jacket on when the dog alerted on the vehicle. 2 This 
misstatement is the reason why the State ignores the argument made in the Appellant's 
Brief that states "[t]here is no meaningful difference between the facts in Gibson and the 
facts in this case other than the fact that Ms. Easterday exited her car with a purse 
instead of a wallet." (App. Br. p.11.) 
Additionally, the misstatement appears to be the reason why the State fails to 
address the fact that the Court of Appeals did not analyze where Mr. Gibson's wallet 
was when the dog alerted on his car. As argued in the Appellant's Brief, it is highly 
likely that Mr. Gibson had to show his driver's license to the officers, and that his license 
was in his wallet. (App. Br. p.11.) Therefore, his wallet was probably out of his jacket at 
some point. But again, the Gibson Court was not concerned with this because 
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Mr. Gibson's wallet was on his person by the time he exited his car. 3 That was the 
crucial fact. 
Thus, because the State fails to acknowledge the unique nature of purses, it 
does not comprehend the nuance involved when a "container" is a purse or a wallet. 
Indeed, it says that "[u]nder the automobile exception the issue is not whether the 
container was on her person when it was searched, but where the container was when 
probable cause to search was established." (Resp. Br. p.5.) But with a purse or a 
wallet, the analysis is not as straightforward as the State would like it to be. Indeed, if 
the purse or wallet is in normal, ordinary use in the car, and the driver takes it out of the 
car when exiting, it should be considered part of the person and not subject to search. 
C. The State's Arguments Fail Because The State Fails To Grasp How And Why 
Purses Are Used, As Well As The Inherent Discrimination and Unworkable 
Aspects In The District Court's Ruling 
The State asserts that "Easterday's argument that a rule of this nature would 
discriminate against women because women cannot carry their purses while they drive 
and men can carry their wallets while they drive is without merit." (Resp. Br. p.11.) In 
support of this contention, it says that men can also "carry satchels, briefcases, tote 
bags, or other containers that contain identification or other personal items," and a 
"special 'purse' exception to the automobile exception, would create an unworkable 
2 The traffic stop was in the middle of the night in February, so he certainly would have 
needed to put on his jacket when he was told to get out of the car. Id. at 286. 
3 During the suppression hearing, the district court actually asked the prosecutor "How 
is this case different from the Gibson case?" (Tr. 10/25/13, p.18, Ls.15-16.) The 
prosecutor replied that it was different because in Gibson the officers searched 
Mr. Gibson's jacket and found his wallet, so it was "very clearly a search of his person." 
(Tr. 10/25/13, p.19, Ls.1-5.) 
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dilemma for law enforcement who would have to determine if a bag, satchel, briefcase 
or other container would qualify as a 'purse' and not be subject to search." (Resp. 
Br. p.11.) 
First of all, it is obvious that men can carry larger bags if they so choose. The 
important point is that they do not have to. Women do. Not only do they need to carry 
more things, but their clothing, unlike men's, often has no pockets. One could just as 
easily argue that women could carry wallets, so purses should not be considered part of 
the person. But again, this argument fails to acknowledge why women carry purses. 
Secondly, given that law enforcement officers receive extensive training, it seems 
a stretch to assume that they could not discern whether a certain bag was a purse or 
not. And any confusion would not create an unworkable dilemma as the State asserts. 
The only dilemma that could be created is that an officer would need to get a warrant. 
This is certainly a negligible burden to ensure that women are entitled to the same 
privacy as men in their personal possessions. 
And the only way to guarantee this is to acknowledge that purses and wallets, as 
long as they are in normal use (and not, for example, in the back seat, where the driver 
could not claim any ongoing use or control of the item), do not have to be in some sort 
of direct contact with the driver in order to be considered part of the person as long as 
the driver leaves the car with the purse or wallet. Because they both contain 
identification, there will almost always be occasions when the wallet or purse is moved 
to a slightly different location in order to access that identification, or perhaps reach into 
the glove compartment to retrieve registration and insurance. Thus, requiring women to 
keep purses on their laps while driving, and throughout the duration of a traffic stop, in 
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order to enjoy the same privacy rights in purses that men enjoy in wallets is not only 
unsafe but unrealistic. 
Therefore, the search of Ms. Easterday's purse was illegal. Evidence discovered 
as a result of an illegal search must be excluded as the "fruit of the poisonous tree." 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). As such, the district court erred when 
it denied Ms. Easterday's motion to suppress. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Easterday respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's 
order of judgment and commitment and reverse the order which denied her motion to 
suppress. 
DATED this 14th day of January, 2015. 
( 
REED P. ANDERSON 
Deputy State Appellat~ Public Defender 
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